

III. DATA AND FINDINGS ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF STRUCTURAL CONDITIONALITY IN THE 43 CASE STUDIES

40. To analyze program design and the link between SC and further reform, the evaluation team prepared desk studies of 43 programs approved between 1999 and 2003.¹⁴ Thirty countries were selected randomly and the remaining 13 were selected from a stratified sample to provide a representative set for preparing the in-depth studies discussed in Chapter IV.¹⁵ The 43 programs encompass nearly half of the 103 programs that the IMF approved during that period, and account for 1,567 of the 3,652 conditions in these programs.

41. All data on individual conditions in this sample came from the MONA database, including a description of the condition, the condition type—prior action (PA), structural benchmark (SB), or performance criterion (PC), and an assessment of compliance.¹⁶ This analysis had two purposes: (i) to assess the degree of structural depth (SD) of structural conditions in IMF-supported programs—that is, the degree of structural change that the conditions would bring about if implemented; and (ii) to test whether there is a link between compliance with SC and securing durable reform. Closely related to these two tests is whether the relationship between compliance and further reform, or effectiveness, varies according to the degree of SD.

42. Some of the 1,567 conditions could not be represented in most of the calculations and were excluded from the final dataset: (i) 199 conditions did not have a compliance rating in MONA; (ii) nine conditions could not be assigned an SD code because they were poorly drafted in MONA; (iii) one condition was dropped due to double-counting; and (iv) 55 conditions were in sectors that could not be assigned outcome measures. After these changes, the final sample of fully assessed conditions was 1,306. Table 3.1 shows the distribution of conditions among the 43 programs.

¹⁴ The period was truncated at 2003 to avoid selecting programs that may have been ongoing at the time the evaluation started. The sample comprises 13 General Resource Account (GRA) programs (12 SBAs and 1 EFF) and 30 programs between PRGFs (26) and ESAFs (4).

¹⁵ The 13 cases were selected so as to ensure geographical diversity of programs, the presence of precautionary and non-precautionary SBAs, and HIPC-eligible and non-HIPC eligible PRGFs.

¹⁶ Even though 13 of the 43 cases were studied in detail, at this stage the evaluation team used only the conditions detailed in MONA (rather than a reconstruction based on Board documents and other internal documentation, as was done for the detailed studies). Of these conditions, only those for which data on compliance was available were used.

Table 3.1. Distribution of Structural Conditions Among the 43 Programs

Country	Number of conditions (MONA)	Conditions without compliance ratings	Conditions without structural depth or counted twice	Conditions without sectoral "effectiveness" score	Conditions assessed	Percent assessed
Albania	65	14		19	32	49
Armenia	63	10	2		51	81
Brazil	27	4			23	85
Burkina Faso	30	10		1	19	63
Cameroon	48	12			36	75
Cape Verde	24				24	100
Colombia	28	1		2	25	89
Cote d'Ivoire	14	6		1	7	50
Croatia	25	1			24	96
Dominica	11	4			7	64
Dominican Republic	43	13			30	70
Ecuador	38	4			34	89
Estonia	14				14	100
Gambia, The	8			1	7	88
Georgia	36	7	1	6	22	61
Ghana	77	2	1		74	96
Guatemala	10				10	100
Guinea	19	5		2	12	63
Honduras	52	11		1	40	77
Kazakhstan	16	13			3	19
Kenya	19				19	100
Kyrgyz Republic	42				42	100
Lao, P.D.R.	48	13			35	73
Lesotho	63		1		62	98
Macedonia (FYR)	19			3	16	84
Madagascar	34	1		4	29	85
Mali	51				51	100
Mauritania	13	2			11	85
Mexico	13				13	100
Moldova	21	6			15	71
Mongolia	29	6		3	20	69
Mozambique	57	7		4	46	81
Niger	28				28	100
Pakistan	77	5	3		69	90
Peru	17				17	100
Romania	79		1		78	99
Rwanda	49	8			41	84
Senegal	18	7			11	61
Sierra Leone	57			3	54	95
Tajikistan	37	7	1	2	27	73
Uganda	50	2		1	47	94
Uruguay	58	10			48	83
Zambia	43	8		2	33	77
Total	1570	199	10	55	1306	83

A. General Features of the Sample

43. The distribution of structural conditions across sectors in this sample of countries is consistent with that in the universe of programs approved during 1999–2003 and, more generally, with the average for the period 1995–2004.¹⁷ The evaluation team classified conditions into nine sectoral categories, which are similar to those used by IMF staff in internal reviews of conditionality. The IEO categories are Tax Policy and Tax Administration, Public Expenditure Management (PEM), Financial Sector Reform, State-owned Enterprise (SOE) Reform, Privatization, Civil Service Reform, Social Policies, “Other Fund Core,” and “Other World Bank Core.” Table 3.2 shows the areas covered by each of the nine.

Table 3.2. Classification of Reform Categories by IEO

Sector Number	Reform Categories	Description
1	Tax Policy and Tax Administration	Revenue issues; tax legislation and regulation; tax policy issues; and tax and customs administration.
2	PEM	Expenditure policy and administration, fiscal reviews (audits, public expenditure reviews), domestic arrears, public debt, guarantees, and contingent liabilities.
3	Financial Sector Reforms and Development	Laws and regulations of the financial sector. Also banking supervision and corrective actions in problem banks.
4	SOE Reform	Restructuring of public enterprises, pricing policies, regulatory reforms in utilities.
5	Privatization	All activities related to the privatization of non-financial SOEs.
6	Civil Service Reform	Wage and employment limits, other measures affecting employment in the public sector.
7	Social Policies	Design of policies in social sectors such as education, health, and pensions.
8	Other Fund Core	Foreign exchange rate regime; exchange rate policy; some aspects of trade policy; capital account issues; monetary policy; macroeconomic and statistics issues; and safeguard assessments issues.
9	Other World Bank Core	Trade liberalization, governance and corruption; poverty reduction and social sector spending; social safety nets; design of sector policies in agriculture, land and roads; marketing and pricing reforms; decentralization; labor market policies; and natural resource management.

¹⁷ In light of the fact that 13 of the 43 cases were studied in greater depth, the evaluation team gauged the explanatory power of the remaining 30 by comparing the predictions of the 13 cases when only information used at the level of general case studies was used (i.e., excluding the additional work required for in-depth studies). To this end, the IEO team focused on the scores of sectoral outputs produced with the general case studies, which relied on a limited number of staff reports for gathering information on outcomes in nine economic sectors. Countries were ranked on the basis of these scores. The resulting ranking was very similar to that obtained using all the information of the in-depth studies (a rank correlation coefficient of 0.78).

44. Of the 1,306 conditions, 49 percent were SBs, 31 percent PAs and 20 percent PCs (Table 3.3). The highest incidence of SBs was found in two categories that fall under the purview of the World Bank: Social Policies and Other World Bank Core (about 70 percent of all conditions in each sector). The highest incidence of PAs was also found in areas that are at the core of World Bank activities, namely privatization and SOE reform, which are also two of the three sectors with the highest incidence of PCs.

Table 3.3. Distribution of Structural Conditions by Type ^{1/}

Sector Number	Sector Description	Number of Conditions					
		Total	GRA	PRGF	PA	PC	SB
1	Tax Policy/Tax Administration	246	40	206	57	65	124
2	PEM	273	46	227	99	53	121
3	Financial Sector	293	120	173	84	48	161
4	SOE Reform	147	47	100	70	35	42
5	Privatization	83	24	59	32	24	27
6	Civil Service Reform	42	8	34	10	9	23
7	Social Policies	34	15	19	6	4	24
8	Other Fund Core	72	15	57	19	10	43
9	Other World Bank Core	116	20	96	23	12	81
Total	All Sectors	1306	335	971	400	260	646
	Core	884	221	663	259	176	449
	Non-Core	422	114	308	141	84	197

Sector Number	Sector Description	Total SC	Percent of Total				
			GRA	PRGF	PA	PC	SB
1	Tax Policy/Tax Administration	246	16	84	23	26	50
2	PEM	273	17	83	36	19	44
3	Financial Sector	293	41	59	29	16	55
4	SOE Reform	147	32	68	48	24	29
5	Privatization	83	29	71	39	29	33
6	Civil Service Reform	42	19	81	24	21	55
7	Social Policies	34	44	56	18	12	71
8	Other Fund Core	72	21	79	26	14	60
9	Other World Bank Core	116	17	83	20	10	70
Total	All Sectors	1306	26	74	31	20	49
	Core	68	66	68	65	68	70
	Non-Core	32	34	32	35	32	30

^{1/} Includes all 1306 fully assessed conditions in the 43 case studies from 1999–2003. Conditions not normalized to correct for program length.

Source: MONA, IMF staff reports and IEO staff calculations.

B. Analysis of Structural Depth

45. The effects of SC depend not only on the number of conditions but also on the degree of structural change that they would bring about if implemented, and on the durability of this change. This evaluation refers to these characteristics as the structural content or depth, and classified the 1,306 conditions in the 43 programs according to the following three categories of SD:¹⁸

- **High SD:** This category covers structural conditions that would bring about long-lasting changes in the institutional environment. Thus, it focuses on measures that involve legislative changes: approval, adoption, or enactment of legislation by a parliament. It also includes conditions requiring that certain fiduciary measures be carried out on a regular and/or permanent basis, even when legislation is not needed (often these measures are put in place through regulation). Finally, the High SD category also includes other conditions with long-lasting structural impact that may be grounded in pre-existing legislation but are likely to require legislation to be undone, e.g., civil service reform or privatization.
- **Limited SD:** This category involves one-off measures that can be expected to have an immediate and possibly significant effect, but that would need to be followed up or repeated in order to have a lasting impact. These conditions are of two main types: (i) conditions requiring fiduciary measures on a one-off basis—such as the one-time publication of the federal budget and of the accounts of public enterprises, or the preparation of specific audits; and (ii) quasi-macro quantitative conditionality, which is often used to specify in detail how the macro conditions of the program—such as changes in controlled prices, limits on wage bill growth, ceilings on debt, or reductions of the arrears of certain public enterprises—would be met in a sustainable manner. Other examples in this intermediate category include conditions leading to: (i) organizational changes that would require significant continued efforts not specified in the program, e.g., administrative measures such as creating a department in a government agency or laying the ground for the introduction of foreign exchange or treasury bill auctions; (ii) the establishment of a pilot system or project; and (iii) the implementation of existing legislation or regulations. Finally, the IEO team also included in this category the approval of a specific budget law. Although this is a legislative action, the approval of one year’s budget will not necessarily have a lasting impact.

¹⁸ The definition of the categories are intended to be comprehensive and exclusive, i.e., each condition falls into one and only one category. The classification was done with a bias towards ascribing to each condition the highest possible SD category, as is illustrated by the examples in Table 1. About a dozen conditions that did not fit clearly into a single category were classified as having Limited SD.

- **Low or No SD:** This category includes conditions that would not, by themselves, bring about any economic changes either structural or macro. Some of these conditions may serve as stepping stones for significant reforms. Examples include the preparation or announcement of plans, strategies, or legislation; the definition of rules; drafting or submission of legislation to Congress; and hiring a consultant to perform a task.

46. Of the 1,306 conditions, only 4 percent fall in the category of High SD. Forty three percent can be characterized as having Low or No SD, with the remaining 53 percent falling in the middle. This distributional pattern is similar for the subsets of conditions in core and non-core areas. Table 3.4 shows the distribution of conditions according to their SD.

47. Using scores of 2 for High SD, 1 for Limited, and 0 for Low SD, the depth of SC in a given sector was initially measured using two different indices: (i) the simple average of the scores of all conditions in that sector, and (ii) the share of High SD conditions in the total number of conditions in that sector.

48. A problem with these indicators is that they are very sensitive to the number of conditions in a sector—many of which may only be included as necessary first steps before more difficult and long-lasting reforms can be enacted. For example, a sector that has one condition of High SD and two conditions of Low SD will appear to have a higher average depth and a higher percentage of High SD conditions than a sector with one condition of High SD and nine conditions of Low SD. Yet, it is not obvious that overall SD in the first sector is higher. To correct for this problem, the IEO team used a third measure based on the maximum depth within a sector (Table 3.5). This measure assigned each sector a depth score equivalent to the highest SD of any individual condition in that sector. In the example above, both sectors would receive a maximum depth score of 2.

C. Analysis of Compliance and Effectiveness

49. The operational definitions for compliance and effectiveness used in the analysis were as follows:

- Compliance data were taken from the MONA database. The analysis is basically conducted on a binary indicator showing whether the agreed conditions were met on time or not. About 54 percent of the 7,139 conditions in MONA were complied with on time (and the compliance rates are similar for the 43 countries). These compliance figures do not include PAs, because in MONA these are met almost by definition—since MONA does not include conditions in programs that have gone off-track. Including PAs, the compliance rate would rise to about two-thirds; on the other hand, the rate would be less than half if programs that went off-track were included. In fact, MONA also has a third compliance category which includes actions that were met late or met only in part. Most of the analysis in this evaluation includes these

conditions in the not met category. According to MONA, about half of the structural conditions that were not met (or about 25 percent of conditions), were eventually met with delay or met only in part. MONA does not distinguish between these two categories, and it does not specify the extent of the delay nor of the compliance.

- Effectiveness was scored according to the extent to which actions in a given economic sector, rather than those specified by a given condition, were followed up by similar, complementary measures so as to achieve the stated goals of the policies. The relevant time horizon to assess was given by the first post-program Article IV staff report.¹⁹ The evaluation team classified effectiveness at the sectoral level using a three-point scale: (i) a score of 1 for cases where follow-up action or further reform took place in the sector, or in cases where no follow up was needed; (ii) a score of -1 for cases where reforms in a sector were reversed or policies rolled back; and (iii) a score of 0 for cases where no subsequent action or reform took place in a sector.

Compliance

50. Compliance rates varied somewhat across sectors and as a function of conditions' SD (Table 3.6).²⁰ Compliance rates were higher in IMF core than other sectors. Compliance was lower for High SD conditions than for conditions with Low or Limited SD, which have very similar compliance patterns. The average compliance rates in PRGFs and GRA programs were similar, but in PRGF countries (and not GRA countries) conditions in core sectors elicited much higher compliance rates than those in non-core sectors. There was little difference in compliance rates between PCs and SBs (Table 3.7).

Effectiveness

51. There were 229 sectors with at least one structural condition for which an effectiveness rating could be given (Table 3.8). In nearly half of the sectors (53 percent) with at least one condition, reforms continued. In the other half, the reform efforts either stalled (37 percent) or were reversed (10 percent). Reforms were more successful in core sectors.

¹⁹ EPAs and subsequent program requests were also used, when available, to produce a score for assessments.

²⁰ All compliance rates discussed exclude PAs, because they are typically met before a program request or review is discussed by the Executive Board.

Table 3.4. Distribution of Structural Conditions by Depth ^{1/}

Sector Number	Sector Description Depth	Number of Conditions			Percent of Total			Average Depth ^{2/}		
		All	Low	Limited	High	All	Low		Limited	High
1	Tax Policy/Tax Administration	246	83	148	15	19	34	60	6	0.72
2	PEM	273	97	169	7	21	36	62	3	0.67
3	Financial Sector	293	154	128	11	22	53	44	4	0.51
4	SOE Reform	147	48	96	3	11	33	65	2	0.69
5	Privatization	83	53	21	9	6	64	25	11	0.47
6	Civil Service Reform	42	24	15	3	3	57	36	7	0.50
7	Social Policies	34	20	12	2	3	59	35	6	0.47
8	Other Fund Core	72	25	45	2	6	35	63	3	0.68
9	Other World Bank Core	116	54	56	6	9	47	48	5	0.59
	Total	1306	558	690	58	100	43	53	4	0.62
	By Program									
	GRA	335	167	143	25	26	50	43	7	0.58
	PRGF	971	391	547	33	74	40	56	3	0.63
	By SC Type									
	SB	646	310	306	30	49	48	47	5	0.57
	PC	260	99	147	14	20	38	57	5	0.67
	PA	400	149	237	14	31	37	59	4	0.66
	Core vs. Non-Core									
	Core	884	359	490	35	68	41	55	4	0.63
	Non-Core	422	199	200	23	32	47	47	5	0.58

^{1/} Includes all 1,306 fully assessed conditions in the 43 case studies from 1999-2003. Conditions not normalized to correct for program length.

^{2/} Calculated as follows: "Low"=0; "Limited"=1; and "High"=2.

Source: MONA, IMF staff reports and IEO staff calculations.

Table 3.5. Distribution of Structural Conditions by Maximum Depth ^{1/}
(Number of conditions)

Sector Number	Sector Description	All Conditions						By Program Type							
		All	0	1	2	All	PRGF	All	0	1	2	All	0	1	2
1	Maximum Depth	35	2	21	12	24	2	15	7	11	11	0	0	1	2
2	Tax Policy/Tax Administration	40	4	31	5	28	2	22	4	12	12	0	0	6	5
3	PEM	35	2	24	9	23	1	15	7	12	12	1	1	9	1
4	Financial Sector	26	4	19	3	21	2	17	2	5	5	2	2	2	1
5	SOE Reform	19	7	8	4	14	5	7	2	5	5	2	2	1	2
6	Privatization	18	5	10	3	14	4	8	2	4	4	1	1	2	1
7	Civil Service Reform	7	1	5	1	3	0	3	0	4	4	1	1	2	1
8	Social Policies	18	1	16	1	14	1	12	1	4	4	0	0	4	0
9	Other Fund Core	31	6	21	4	22	2	18	2	9	9	4	4	3	2
	Other World Bank Core	229	32	155	42	163	19	117	27	66	66	13	38	3	15
	Total	128	9	92	27	89	6	64	19	39	39	3	28	8	8
	Core	101	23	63	15	74	13	53	8	27	27	10	10	7	7
	Non-Core														

Share of Total

Sector Number	Sector Description	All Conditions						By Program Type							
		All	0	1	2	All	PRGF	All	0	1	2	All	0	1	2
1	Maximum Depth	100	6	60	34	100	8	63	29	100	100	0	0	55	45
2	Tax Policy/Tax Administration	100	10	78	13	100	7	79	14	100	100	17	17	75	8
3	PEM	100	6	69	26	100	4	65	30	100	100	8	8	75	17
4	Financial Sector	100	15	73	12	100	10	81	10	100	100	40	40	40	20
5	SOE Reform	100	37	42	21	100	36	50	14	100	100	40	40	20	40
6	Privatization	100	28	56	17	100	29	57	14	100	100	25	25	50	25
7	Civil Service Reform	100	14	71	14	100	0	100	0	100	100	25	25	50	25
8	Social Policies	100	6	89	6	100	7	86	7	100	100	0	0	100	0
9	Other Fund Core	100	19	68	13	100	9	82	9	100	100	44	44	33	22
	Other World Bank Core	100	14	68	18	100	12	72	17	100	100	20	20	58	23
	Total	100	7	72	21	100	7	72	21	100	100	8	8	72	21
	Core	100	23	62	15	100	18	72	11	100	100	37	37	37	26
	Non-Core														

1/ For each sector with at least one condition that is fully assessed (i.e., has a rating for type, depth, compliance and further reform), the highest depth score of any single condition is recorded as the "maximum depth" for that sector.

Source: MONA, IMF staff reports and IEO staff calculations.

Table 3.6. Compliance Rates by Structural Depth and Sector^{1/}

Sector Number	Structural Depth	All Programs											
		All			0			1			2		
		Number	Percent of Total	Compliance Rate	Number	Percent of Total	Compliance Rate	Number	Percent of Total	Compliance Rate	Number	Percent of Total	Compliance Rate
1	Tax Policy	189	21	64	70	17	59	109	24	69	10	23	50
2	PEM	174	19	53	67	16	58	101	22	51	6	14	33
3	Financial Sector	209	23	56	111	27	58	90	20	58	8	18	13
4	SOE Reform	77	8	43	24	6	42	52	11	44	1	2	0
5	Privatization	51	6	29	33	8	30	12	3	33	6	14	17
6	Civil Service Reform	32	4	31	18	4	22	11	2	45	3	7	33
7	Social Policies	28	3	43	18	4	44	8	2	50	2	5	0
8	Other Fund Core	53	6	64	20	5	70	31	7	61	2	5	50
9	Other WB Core	93	10	54	48	12	58	39	9	49	6	14	50
Total	All Sectors	906	100	54	409	100	54	453	100	54	44	100	32
Core		625	69	58	268	66	59	331	73	60	26	59	35
Non-Core		281	31	43	141	34	43	122	27	45	18	41	28

Sector Number	Structural Depth	PRGF Only											
		All			0			1			2		
		Number	Percent of Total	Compliance Rate	Number	Percent of Total	Compliance Rate	Number	Percent of Total	Compliance Rate	Number	Percent of Total	Compliance Rate
1	Tax Policy/Tax Administration	162	23	63	58	19	57	99	26	67	5	21	60
2	PEM	153	22	56	58	19	60	90	24	54	5	21	20
3	Financial Sector	135	19	61	64	21	69	64	17	58	7	29	14
4	SOE Reform	58	8	38	16	5	31	41	11	41	1	4	0
5	Privatization	37	5	30	26	9	27	11	3	36	0	0	0
6	Civil Service Reform	28	4	32	16	5	25	10	3	40	2	8	50
7	Social Policies	13	2	31	9	3	33	4	1	25	0	0	0
8	Other Fund Core	47	7	70	19	6	68	26	7	73	2	8	50
9	Other World Bank Core	78	11	49	39	13	51	37	10	49	2	8	0
Total	All Sectors	711	100	54	305	100	54	382	100	56	24	100	29
Core		497	70	61	199	65	63	279	62	61	19	79	32
None-Core		214	30	39	106	35	37	103	23	43	5	21	20

Table 3.6. Compliance Rates by Structural Depth and Sector (concluded)

Sector Number	Structural Depth	GRA Only															
		All				0				1				2			
		Number	Percent of Total	Compliance Rate	Number	Percent of Total	Compliance Rate	Number	Percent of Total	Compliance Rate	Number	Percent of Total	Compliance Rate	Number	Percent of Total	Compliance Rate	
1	Tax Policy/Tax Administration	27	14	70	12	12	67	10	14	90	5	25	40				
2	PEM	21	11	38	9	9	44	11	15	27	1	5	100				
3	Financial Sector	74	38	47	47	45	43	26	37	58	1	5	0				
4	SOE Reform	19	10	58	8	8	63	11	15	55	0	0	0				
5	Privatization	14	7	29	7	7	43	1	1	0	6	30	17				
6	Civil Service Reform	4	2	25	2	2	0	1	1	100	1	5	0				
7	Social Policies	15	8	53	9	9	56	4	6	75	2	10	0				
8	Other Fund Core	6	3	17	1	1	100	5	7	0	0	0	0				
9	Other World Bank Core	15	8	80	9	9	89	2	3	50	4	20	75				
	Total	195	100	51	104	100	52	71	100	54	20	100	35				
	Core	128	18	49	69	23	48	52	11	52	7	29	43				
	Non-Core	67	9	54	35	11	60	19	4	58	13	54	31				

1/ Includes 906 fully assessed conditions in the 43 case study countries excluding all PAs. Conditions not normalized to correct for program length.

Table 3.8. Effectiveness at the Sectoral Level

Sector Number	Sector Description	Number of Sectors						Percent of Total				
		Reversal	Change	No Further Reform	Total	Sector Average 1/	Reversal	Change	No Further Reform			
	Sector Outcome											
1	Tax Policy/Tax Administration	3	12	20	35	0.49	9	34	57			
2	PEM	5	12	23	40	0.45	13	30	58			
3	Financial Sector	2	13	20	35	0.51	6	37	57			
4	SOE Reform	3	7	16	26	0.50	12	27	62			
5	Privatization	4	11	4	19	0.00	21	58	21			
6	Civil Service Reform	2	8	8	18	0.33	11	44	44			
7	Social Policies	1	1	5	7	0.57	14	14	71			
8	Other Fund Core	0	8	10	18	0.56	0	44	56			
9	Other World Bank Core	3	13	15	31	0.39	10	42	48			
	Total	23	85	121	229	0.43	10	37	53			
	Core	10	45	73	128	0.49	8	35	57			
	Non-Core	13	40	48	101	0.35	13	40	48			

1/ Calculated as follows: "Reversal"=-1; "No Change"=0; and "Further Reform"=1.

Source: MONA, IMF staff reports and IEO staff calculations.

52. Effectiveness was also measured at the level of individual conditions. In other words, each of the 1,306 assessed conditions was awarded an effectiveness score based on the overall score for its sector. The distribution across all dimensions can be found in Tables 3.9–3.11. Again, positive effectiveness scores were more common in core sectors.

D. Relationships Between Variables

Compliance and effectiveness

53. To measure the link between compliance and effectiveness, the evaluation team estimated simple correlation coefficients between these two variables at the sectoral level. As described earlier, the team was able to assign an effectiveness score to 1,306 conditions, and the number of sectors for which there was at least one structural condition in the 43 programs was 229.

54. Two sets of correlations were estimated. The first was at the sectoral level using compliance rates and effectiveness scores for 225 observations.²¹ The second set measured the same relationship at the condition level, substituting individual condition compliance and assigning each of the 906 SBs and PCs that were shown in Table 3.3 the effectiveness measure awarded to its respective sector.

55. Neither set of tests revealed a significant correlation between compliance and the IEO measure of effectiveness. This result is true not only for the sample as a whole (i.e., when all observations are pooled) but also when the estimation is restricted to the sectoral level (i.e., correlating compliance and effectiveness in one sector at a time).

Compliance and depth

56. The evaluation team also explored the relationship between compliance and SD by estimating correlation coefficients for all 906 conditions (excluding PAs), but found no significant relationship between the two variables. Similar coefficients were also estimated at the sector level, using the sector compliance rate and both average SD and maximum SD within the sector. Again, these data did not reveal a significant relationship.

Depth and effectiveness

Correlation coefficients were also estimated at the sector level to examine the relationship between SD and effectiveness. These estimates used data on effectiveness measures and on average SD within a sector for the sample of 229 sectors with at least one fully assessed

²¹ Four sectors contained only PAs and were excluded from the sample. Several variations were also performed using different compliance measures, including a binary compliance indicator (“1” signifying above average compliance in a sector and “0” signifying below average). Results were similar for all measures.

condition. No significant correlation was observed. The result was the same when maximum depth was substituted for average depth.

Table 3.9. Effectiveness by Structural Depth, Compliance, and Type^{1/}

I. All Conditions		Number of Conditions															
Sector Number	Sector Description	All Conditions															
		All				No Compliance				Partial Compliance				Full Compliance			
Depth	Effectiveness	All	-1	0	1	All	-1	0	1	All	-1	0	1	All	-1	0	1
	Tax Policy/Tax Administration	189	3	57	129	36	0	16	20	32	0	5	27	121	3	36	82
1	PEM	174	19	30	125	31	2	6	23	50	4	10	36	93	13	14	66
2	Financial Sector	209	12	84	113	37	1	19	17	55	3	19	33	117	8	46	63
3	SOE Reform	77	5	17	55	18	2	2	14	26	2	8	16	33	1	7	25
4	Privatization	51	4	35	12	14	2	6	6	22	2	17	3	15	0	12	3
5	Civil Service Reform	32	4	11	17	7	3	3	1	15	0	5	10	10	1	3	6
6	Social Policies	28	4	2	22	8	3	1	4	8	1	1	6	12	0	0	12
7	Other Fund Core	53	0	26	27	11	0	8	3	8	0	4	4	34	0	14	20
8	Other World Bank Core	93	4	48	41	13	2	6	5	30	1	19	10	50	1	23	26
9	Total	906	55	310	541	175	15	67	93	246	13	88	145	485	27	155	303
	Core	625	34	197	394	115	3	49	63	145	7	38	100	365	24	110	231
	Non-Core	281	21	113	147	60	12	18	30	101	6	50	45	120	3	45	72

Sector Number		Percent of Total															
Sector Description	Depth	All Conditions															
		All				No Compliance				Partial Compliance				Full Compliance			
Effectiveness	Effectiveness	All	-1	0	1	All	-1	0	1	All	-1	0	1	All	-1	0	1
	Tax Policy/Tax Administration	100	2	30	68	100	0	44	56	100	0	16	84	100	2	30	68
1	PEM	100	11	17	72	100	6	19	74	100	8	20	72	100	14	15	71
2	Financial Sector	100	6	40	54	100	3	51	46	100	5	35	60	100	7	39	54
3	SOE Reform	100	6	22	71	100	11	11	78	100	8	31	62	100	3	21	76
4	Privatization	100	8	69	24	100	14	43	43	100	9	77	14	100	0	80	20
5	Civil Service Reform	100	13	34	53	100	43	43	14	100	0	33	67	100	10	30	60
6	Social Policies	100	14	7	79	100	38	13	50	100	13	13	75	100	0	0	100
7	Other Fund Core	100	0	49	51	100	0	73	27	100	0	50	50	100	0	41	59
8	Other World Bank Core	100	4	52	44	100	15	46	38	100	3	63	33	100	2	46	52
9	Total	100	6	34	60	100	9	38	53	100	5	36	59	100	6	32	62
	Core	100	5	32	63	100	3	43	55	100	5	26	69	100	7	30	63
	Non-Core	100	7	40	52	100	20	30	50	100	6	50	45	100	3	38	60

Table 3.9. Effectiveness by Structural Depth, Compliance, and Type ^{1/} (continued)

II. All SD 0		Number of Conditions															
Sector Number	Sector Description	All Depth 0 Conditions						Percent of Total									
		Compliance		No Compliance		Partial Compliance		All Depth 0 Conditions		No Compliance		Partial Compliance					
Depth		All	-1	0	1	All	-1	0	1	All	-1	0	1	All	-1	0	1
1	Tax Policy/Tax Administration	70	1	23	46	13	0	6	7	16	0	4	12	41	1	13	27
2	PEM	67	7	12	48	12	0	3	9	16	1	3	12	39	6	6	27
3	Financial Sector	111	6	44	61	19	1	10	8	28	1	8	19	64	4	26	34
4	SOE Reform	24	1	6	17	8	1	1	6	6	0	1	5	10	0	4	6
5	Privatization	33	4	22	7	6	2	2	2	17	2	12	3	10	0	8	2
6	Civil Service Reform	18	0	6	12	3	0	2	1	11	0	3	8	4	0	1	3
7	Social Policies	18	2	1	15	4	1	0	3	6	1	1	4	8	0	0	8
8	Other Fund Core	20	0	10	10	3	0	2	1	3	0	1	2	14	0	7	7
9	Other World Bank Core	48	2	26	20	4	1	3	0	16	1	11	4	28	0	12	16
Total		409	23	150	236	72	6	29	37	119	6	44	69	218	11	77	130
	Core	268	14	89	165	47	1	21	25	63	2	16	45	158	11	52	95
	Non-Core	141	9	61	71	25	5	8	12	56	4	28	24	60	0	25	35
Sector Description		Percent of Total															
Sector Number	Sector Description	All Depth 0 Conditions						Percent of Total									
		Compliance		No Compliance		Partial Compliance		All Depth 0 Conditions		No Compliance		Partial Compliance					
Depth		All	-1	0	1	All	-1	0	1	All	-1	0	1	All	-1	0	1
1	Tax Policy/Tax Administration	100	1	33	66	100	0	46	54	100	0	25	75	100	2	32	66
2	PEM	100	10	18	72	100	0	25	75	100	6	19	75	100	15	15	69
3	Financial Sector	100	5	40	55	100	5	53	42	100	4	29	68	100	6	41	53
4	SOE Reform	100	4	25	71	100	13	13	75	100	0	17	83	100	0	40	60
5	Privatization	100	12	67	21	100	33	33	33	100	12	71	18	100	0	80	20
6	Civil Service Reform	100	0	33	67	100	0	67	33	100	0	27	73	100	0	25	75
7	Social Policies	100	11	6	83	100	25	0	75	100	17	17	67	100	0	0	100
8	Other Fund Core	100	0	50	50	100	0	67	33	100	0	33	67	100	0	50	50
9	Other World Bank Core	100	4	54	42	100	25	75	0	100	6	69	25	100	0	43	57
Total		100	6	37	58	100	8	40	51	100	5	37	58	100	5	35	60
	Core	100	5	33	62	100	2	45	53	100	3	25	71	100	7	33	60
	Non-Core	100	6	43	50	100	20	32	48	100	7	50	43	100	0	42	58

Table 3.9. Effectiveness by Structural Depth, Compliance, and Type ^{1/} (continued)

Sector Number	Sector Description	Number of Conditions															
		All Depth 1 Conditions						Partial Compliance						Full Compliance			
		All	-1	0	1	All	-1	0	1	All	-1	0	1	All	-1	0	1
	Compliance																
	Effectiveness	All	-1	0	1	All	-1	0	1	All	-1	0	1	All	-1	0	1
	Tax Policy/Tax Administration	109	2	31	76	20	0	7	13	14	0	1	13	75	2	23	50
1	PEM	101	11	17	73	18	2	3	13	31	3	6	22	52	6	8	38
2	Financial Sector	90	6	37	47	15	0	8	7	23	2	9	12	52	4	20	28
3	SOE Reform	52	3	11	38	10	1	1	8	19	1	7	11	23	1	3	19
4	Privatization	12	0	7	5	6	0	2	4	2	0	2	0	4	0	3	1
5	Civil Service Reform	11	3	3	5	3	2	1	0	3	0	1	2	5	1	1	3
6	Social Policies	8	0	1	7	2	0	1	1	2	0	0	2	4	0	0	4
7	Other Fund Core	31	0	14	17	8	0	6	2	4	0	2	2	19	0	6	13
8	Other World Bank Core	39	2	20	17	7	1	3	3	13	0	8	5	19	1	9	9
9	Total	453	27	141	285	89	6	32	51	111	6	36	69	253	15	73	165
	Core	331	19	99	213	61	2	24	35	72	5	18	49	198	12	57	129
	Non-Core	122	8	42	72	28	4	8	16	39	1	18	20	55	3	16	36
	Percent of Total																
	Compliance																
	Effectiveness	All	-1	0	1	All	-1	0	1	All	-1	0	1	All	-1	0	1
	Tax Policy/Tax Administration	100	2	28	70	100	0	35	65	100	0	7	93	100	3	31	67
1	PEM	100	11	17	72	100	11	17	72	100	10	19	71	100	12	15	73
2	Financial Sector	100	7	41	52	100	0	53	47	100	9	39	52	100	8	38	54
3	SOE Reform	100	6	21	73	100	10	10	80	100	5	37	58	100	4	13	83
4	Privatization	100	0	58	42	100	0	33	67	100	0	100	0	100	0	75	25
5	Civil Service Reform	100	27	27	45	100	67	33	0	100	0	33	67	100	20	20	60
6	Social Policies	100	0	13	88	100	0	50	50	100	0	0	100	100	0	0	100
7	Other Fund Core	100	0	45	55	100	0	75	25	100	0	50	50	100	0	32	68
8	Other World Bank Core	100	5	51	44	100	14	43	43	100	0	62	38	100	5	47	47
9	Total	100	6	31	63	100	7	36	57	100	5	32	62	100	6	29	65
	Core	100	6	30	64	100	3	39	57	100	7	25	68	100	6	29	65
	Non-Core	100	7	34	59	100	14	29	57	100	3	46	51	100	5	29	65

III. All SD 1

Table 3.9. Effectiveness by Structural Depth, Compliance, and Type ^{1/} (concluded)

Sector Number	Sector Description	Number of Conditions																
		All Depth 2 Conditions						Partial Compliance						Full Compliance				
		All		No Compliance		All		No Compliance		All		No Compliance		All				
		-1	0	1	-1	0	1	-1	0	1	-1	0	1	-1	0	1		
1	Tax Policy/Tax Administration	10	0	3	7	3	0	3	0	2	0	0	0	2	5	0	0	5
2	PEM	6	1	1	4	1	0	0	1	3	0	1	2	2	2	1	0	1
3	Financial Sector	8	0	3	5	3	0	1	2	4	0	2	2	1	0	0	0	1
4	SOE Reform	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
5	Privatization	6	0	6	0	2	0	2	0	3	0	3	0	1	0	1	0	0
6	Civil Service Reform	3	1	2	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	0
7	Social Policies	2	2	0	0	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
8	Other Fund Core	2	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	0
9	Other World Bank Core	6	0	2	4	2	0	2	1	1	0	0	1	3	0	2	1	1
Total		44	5	19	20	14	3	6	5	16	1	8	7	14	1	5	8	8
	Core	26	1	9	16	7	0	4	3	10	0	4	6	9	1	1	7	7
	Non-Core	18	4	10	4	7	3	2	2	6	1	4	1	5	0	4	1	1

Sector Number	Sector Description	Percent of Total																
		All Depth 2 Conditions						Partial Compliance						Full Compliance				
		All		No Compliance		All		No Compliance		All		No Compliance		All				
		-1	0	1	-1	0	1	-1	0	1	-1	0	1	-1	0	1		
1	Tax Policy/Tax Administration	100	0	30	70	100	0	100	0	100	0	0	100	100	0	0	100	100
2	PEM	100	17	17	67	100	0	0	100	100	0	33	67	100	50	0	50	100
3	Financial Sector	100	0	38	63	100	0	33	67	100	0	50	50	100	0	0	100	100
4	SOE Reform	100	100	0	0	100	0	100	0	100	100	0	0	100	0	0	100	100
5	Privatization	100	0	100	0	100	0	100	0	100	0	100	0	100	0	100	0	100
6	Civil Service Reform	100	33	67	0	100	100	0	0	100	0	100	0	100	0	100	0	100
7	Social Policies	100	100	0	0	100	100	0	0	100	0	100	0	100	0	100	0	100
8	Other Fund Core	100	0	100	0	100	0	100	0	100	0	100	0	100	0	100	0	100
9	Other World Bank Core	100	0	33	67	100	0	0	100	100	0	0	100	100	0	67	33	100
Total		100	11	43	45	100	21	43	36	100	6	50	44	100	7	36	57	100
	Core	100	4	35	62	100	0	57	43	100	0	40	60	100	11	11	78	100
	Non-Core	100	22	56	22	100	43	29	29	100	17	67	17	100	0	80	20	100

1/ Includes 906 fully assessed conditions in the 43 case study countries excluding all PAs. Conditions not normalized to correct for program length.

Source: MONA, IMF staff reports and IEO staff calculations.

Table 3.10. Effectiveness by Structural Depth, Compliance, and Type: PRGFs ^{1/}

I. All Conditions in PRGFs only

Sector Number	Sector Description	Number of Conditions															
		All Conditions						Partial Compliance						Full Compliance			
		All	-1	0	1	All	-1	0	1	All	-1	0	1	All	-1	0	1
	Compliance																
	Effectiveness	All	-1	0	1	All	-1	0	1	All	-1	0	1	All	-1	0	1
1	Tax Policy/Tax Administration	162	3	46	113	30	0	10	20	30	0	4	26	102	3	32	67
2	PEM	153	18	22	113	26	1	5	20	42	4	5	33	85	13	12	60
3	Financial Sector	135	12	42	81	15	1	2	12	38	3	10	25	82	8	30	44
4	SOE Reform	58	2	17	39	15	1	2	12	21	0	9	12	22	1	6	15
5	Privatization	37	4	21	12	11	2	3	6	15	2	10	3	11	0	8	3
6	Civil Service Reform	28	4	8	16	7	3	3	1	12	0	2	10	9	1	3	5
7	Social Policies	13	0	2	11	3	0	1	2	6	0	1	5	4	0	0	4
8	Other Fund Core	47	0	23	24	9	0	6	3	5	0	3	2	33	0	14	19
9	Other World Bank Core	78	4	45	29	11	2	6	3	29	1	19	9	38	1	20	17
Total		711	47	226	438	127	10	38	79	198	10	63	125	386	27	125	234
	Core	497	33	133	331	80	2	23	55	115	7	22	86	302	24	88	190
	Non-Core	214	14	93	107	47	8	15	24	83	3	41	39	84	3	37	44
Sector Number	Sector Description	Percent of Total															
Depth	Compliance																
Effectiveness	Effectiveness	All	-1	0	1	All	-1	0	1	All	-1	0	1	All	-1	0	1
	Effectiveness	All	-1	0	1	All	-1	0	1	All	-1	0	1	All	-1	0	1
1	Tax Policy/Tax Administration	100	2	28	70	100	0	33	67	100	0	13	87	100	3	31	66
2	PEM	100	12	14	74	100	4	19	77	100	10	12	79	100	15	14	71
3	Financial Sector	100	9	31	60	100	7	13	80	100	8	26	66	100	10	37	54
4	SOE Reform	100	3	29	67	100	7	13	80	100	0	43	57	100	5	27	68
5	Privatization	100	11	57	32	100	18	27	55	100	13	67	20	100	0	73	27
6	Civil Service Reform	100	14	29	57	100	43	43	14	100	0	17	83	100	11	33	56
7	Social Policies	100	0	15	85	100	0	33	67	100	0	17	83	100	0	0	100
8	Other Fund Core	100	0	49	51	100	0	67	33	100	0	60	40	100	0	42	58
9	Other World Bank Core	100	5	58	37	100	18	55	27	100	3	66	31	100	3	53	45
Total		100	7	32	62	100	8	30	62	100	5	32	63	100	7	32	61
	Core	100	7	27	67	100	3	29	69	100	6	19	75	100	8	29	63
	Non-Core	100	7	43	50	100	17	32	51	100	4	49	47	100	4	44	52

Table 3.10. Effectiveness by Structural Depth, Compliance, and Type: PRGFs ^{1/} (continued)

Sector Number	Sector Description	Number of Conditions															
		Depth						Compliance									
		All		No Compliance		All Depth 0 Conditions		All		No Compliance		Partial Compliance					
	Effectiveness	All	-1	0	1	All	-1	0	1	All	-1	0	1	All	-1	0	1
1	Tax Policy/Tax Administration	58	1	16	41	11	0	4	7	14	0	3	11	33	1	9	23
2	PEM	58	7	9	42	10	0	2	8	13	1	2	10	35	6	5	24
3	Financial Sector	64	6	16	42	5	1	0	4	15	1	2	12	44	4	14	26
4	SOE Reform	16	0	5	11	6	0	1	5	5	0	1	4	5	0	3	2
5	Privatization	26	4	15	7	6	2	2	2	13	2	8	3	7	0	5	2
6	Civil Service Reform	16	0	4	12	3	0	2	1	9	0	1	8	4	0	1	3
7	Social Policies	9	0	1	8	1	0	0	1	5	0	1	4	3	0	0	3
8	Other Fund Core	19	0	10	9	3	0	2	1	3	0	1	2	13	0	7	6
9	Other World Bank Core	39	2	25	12	4	1	3	0	15	1	11	3	20	0	11	9
Total		305	20	101	184	49	4	16	29	92	5	30	57	164	11	55	98
	Core	199	14	51	134	29	1	8	20	45	2	8	35	125	11	35	79
	Non-Core	106	6	50	50	20	3	8	9	47	3	22	22	39	0	20	19

Sector Number	Sector Description	Percent of Total															
		Depth						Compliance									
		All		No Compliance		All Depth 0 Conditions		All		No Compliance		Partial Compliance					
	Effectiveness	All	-1	0	1	All	-1	0	1	All	-1	0	1	All	-1	0	1
1	Tax Policy/Tax Administration	100	2	28	71	100	0	36	64	100	0	21	79	100	3	27	70
2	PEM	100	12	16	72	100	0	20	80	100	8	15	77	100	17	14	69
3	Financial Sector	100	9	25	66	100	20	0	80	100	7	13	80	100	9	32	59
4	SOE Reform	100	0	31	69	100	0	17	83	100	0	20	80	100	0	60	40
5	Privatization	100	15	58	27	100	33	33	33	100	15	62	23	100	0	71	29
6	Civil Service Reform	100	0	25	75	100	0	67	33	100	0	11	89	100	0	25	75
7	Social Policies	100	0	11	89	100	0	0	100	100	0	20	80	100	0	0	100
8	Other Fund Core	100	0	53	47	100	0	67	33	100	0	33	67	100	0	54	46
9	Other World Bank Core	100	5	64	31	100	25	75	0	100	7	73	20	100	0	55	45
Total		100	7	33	60	100	8	33	59	100	5	33	62	100	7	34	60
	Core	100	7	26	67	100	3	28	69	100	4	18	78	100	9	28	63
	Non-Core	100	6	47	47	100	15	40	45	100	6	47	47	100	0	51	49

Table 3.10. Effectiveness by Structural Depth, Compliance, and Type: PRGFs ^{1/} (continued)

III. All SD 1 in PRGFs		Number of Conditions																		
Sector Number	Sector Description	All Depth 1 Conditions						Percent of Total												
		All	No Compliance	All	Partial Compliance	All	Full Compliance	All	No Compliance	All	Partial Compliance	All	Full Compliance							
	Depth	All	-1	0	1	1	All	-1	0	1	1	All	-1	0	1	All	-1	0	1	
	Effectiveness	All	-1	0	1	1	All	-1	0	1	1	All	-1	0	1	All	-1	0	1	
	Tax Policy/Tax																			
1	Administration	99	2	30	67	19	0	6	13	14	0	1	13	66	2	23	41			
2	PEM	90	10	13	67	15	1	3	11	26	3	3	20	49	6	7	36			
3	Financial Sector	64	6	24	34	8	0	2	6	19	2	6	11	37	4	16	17			
4	SOE Reform	41	2	11	28	9	1	1	7	15	0	7	8	17	1	3	13			
5	Privatization	11	0	6	5	5	0	1	4	2	0	2	0	4	0	3	1			
6	Civil Service Reform	10	3	3	4	3	2	1	0	3	0	1	2	4	1	1	2			
7	Social Policies	4	0	1	3	2	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	1			
8	Other Fund Core	26	0	11	15	6	0	4	2	1	0	1	0	19	0	6	13			
9	Other World Bank Core	37	2	20	15	6	1	3	2	13	0	8	5	18	1	9	8			
Total		382	25	119	238	73	5	22	46	94	5	29	60	215	15	68	132			
	Core	279	18	78	183	48	1	15	32	60	5	11	44	171	12	52	107			
	Non-Core	103	7	41	55	25	4	7	14	34	0	18	16	44	3	16	25			
	Tax Policy/Tax																			
	Administration	100	2	30	68	100	0	32	68	100	0	7	93	100	3	35	62			
	PEM	100	11	14	74	100	7	20	73	100	12	12	77	100	12	14	73			
	Financial Sector	100	9	38	53	100	0	25	75	100	11	32	58	100	11	43	46			
	SOE Reform	100	5	27	68	100	11	11	78	100	0	47	53	100	6	18	76			
	Privatization	100	0	55	45	100	0	20	80	100	0	100	0	100	0	75	25			
	Civil Service Reform	100	30	30	40	100	67	33	0	100	0	33	67	100	25	25	50			
	Social Policies	100	0	25	75	100	0	50	50	100	0	0	100	100	0	0	100			
	Other Fund Core	100	0	42	58	100	0	67	33	100	0	100	0	100	0	32	68			
	Other World Bank Core	100	5	54	41	100	17	50	33	100	0	62	38	100	6	50	44			
Total		100	7	31	62	100	7	30	63	100	5	31	64	100	7	32	61			
	Core	100	6	28	66	100	2	31	67	100	8	18	73	100	7	30	63			
	Non-Core	100	7	40	53	100	16	28	56	100	0	53	47	100	7	36	57			

Table 3.10. Effectiveness by Structural Depth, Compliance, and Type: PRGFs^{1/} (concluded)

IV. All SD 2 in PRGFs		Number of Conditions															
Sector Number	Sector Description	All Depth 2 Conditions						Partial Compliance									
		All	-1	0	1	All	-1	0	1	All	-1	0	1				
	Compliance																
	Effectiveness	All	-1	0	1	All	-1	0	1	All	-1	0	1	All	-1	0	1
	Tax Policy/Tax																
1	Administration	5	0	0	5	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	2	3	0	0	3
2	PEM	5	1	0	4	1	0	0	1	3	0	0	3	1	1	0	0
3	Financial Sector	7	0	2	5	2	0	0	2	4	0	2	2	1	0	0	1
4	SOE Reform	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
5	Privatization	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
6	Civil Service Reform	2	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0
7	Social Policies	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
8	Other Fund Core	2	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	0
9	Other World Bank Core	2	0	0	2	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
Total		24	2	6	16	5	1	0	4	12	0	4	8	7	1	2	4
	Core	19	1	4	14	3	0	0	3	10	0	3	7	6	1	1	4
	Non-Core	5	1	2	2	2	1	0	1	2	0	1	1	1	0	1	0

IV. All SD 2 in PRGFs		Percent of Total															
Sector Number	Sector Description	All Depth 2 Conditions						Partial Compliance									
		All	-1	0	1	All	-1	0	1	All	-1	0	1				
	Compliance																
	Effectiveness	All	-1	0	1	All	-1	0	1	All	-1	0	1	All	-1	0	1
	Tax Policy/Tax																
1	Administration	100	0	0	100	100	0	0	0	100	0	0	100	100	0	0	100
2	PEM	100	20	0	80	100	0	0	100	100	0	0	100	100	100	0	0
3	Financial Sector	100	0	29	71	100	0	0	100	100	0	50	50	100	0	0	100
4	SOE Reform	100	0	100	0	100	0	0	100	100	0	100	0	100	0	0	100
5	Privatization	100	50	50	0	100	100	0	0	100	0	100	0	100	0	100	0
6	Civil Service Reform	100	0	100	0	100	0	0	0	100	0	100	0	100	0	100	0
7	Social Policies	100	0	100	0	100	0	0	100	100	0	100	0	100	0	100	0
8	Other Fund Core	100	0	0	100	100	0	0	100	100	0	0	100	100	0	100	0
9	Other World Bank Core	100	8	25	67	100	20	0	80	100	0	33	67	100	14	29	57
Total		100	5	21	74	100	0	0	100	100	0	30	70	100	17	17	67
	Core	100	20	40	40	100	50	0	50	100	0	50	50	100	0	100	0
	Non-Core	100	0	0	100	100	0	0	100	100	0	0	100	100	0	100	0

1/ Includes 906 fully assessed conditions in the 43 case study countries excluding all PAS. Conditions not normalized to correct for program length. Source: MONA, IMF staff reports and IEO staff calculations.

Table 3.11. Effectiveness by Structural Depth, Compliance, and Type: GRA^{1/} (continued)

II. All SD 0 in GRA		Number of Conditions															
Sector Number	Sector Description	All						Percent of Total									
		All		No Compliance		All Depth 0 Conditions		All		No Compliance		All Depth 0 Conditions					
		All	-1	0	1	All	-1	0	1	All	-1	0	1	All	-1	0	1
	Tax Policy/Tax Administration	12	0	7	5	2	0	2	0	2	0	1	1	8	0	4	4
1	Administration	9	0	3	6	2	0	1	1	3	0	1	2	4	0	1	3
2	PEM	47	0	28	19	14	0	10	4	13	0	6	7	20	0	12	8
3	Financial Sector	8	1	1	6	2	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	5	0	1	4
4	SOE Reform	7	0	7	0	0	0	0	0	4	0	4	0	3	0	3	0
5	Privatization	2	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	2	0	0	0	0	0
6	Civil Service Reform	9	2	0	7	3	1	0	2	1	1	0	0	5	0	0	5
7	Social Policies	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
8	Other Fund Core	9	0	1	8	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	8	0	1	7
9	Other World Bank Core	104	3	49	52	23	2	13	8	27	1	14	12	54	0	22	32
Total		69	0	38	31	18	0	13	5	18	0	8	10	33	0	17	16
	Core	35	3	11	21	5	2	0	3	9	1	6	2	21	0	5	16
	Non-Core																

II. All SD 0 in GRA		Number of Conditions															
Sector Number	Sector Description	All						Percent of Total									
		All		No Compliance		All Depth 0 Conditions		All		No Compliance		All Depth 0 Conditions					
		All	-1	0	1	All	-1	0	1	All	-1	0	1	All	-1	0	1
	Tax Policy/Tax Administration	100	0	58	42	100	0	100	0	100	0	50	50	100	0	50	50
1	Administration	100	0	33	67	100	0	50	50	100	0	33	67	100	0	25	75
2	PEM	100	0	60	40	100	0	71	29	100	0	46	54	100	0	60	40
3	Financial Sector	100	13	13	75	100	50	0	50	100	0	0	100	100	0	20	80
4	SOE Reform	100	0	100	0	100	0	0	0	100	0	100	0	100	0	100	0
5	Privatization	100	0	100	0	100	0	0	0	100	0	100	0	100	0	100	0
6	Civil Service Reform	100	0	100	0	100	0	0	0	100	0	100	0	100	0	100	0
7	Social Policies	100	22	0	78	100	33	0	67	100	100	0	0	100	0	0	100
8	Other Fund Core	100	0	0	100	100	0	0	0	100	0	0	100	100	0	0	100
9	Other World Bank Core	100	0	11	89	100	0	0	0	100	0	0	100	100	0	13	88
Total		100	3	47	50	100	9	57	35	100	4	52	44	100	0	41	59
	Core	100	0	55	45	100	0	72	28	100	0	44	56	100	0	52	48
	Non-Core	100	9	31	60	100	40	0	60	100	11	67	22	100	0	24	76

Table 3.11. Effectiveness by Structural Depth, Compliance, and Type: GRA^{1/} (continued)

III. All SD 1 in GRA		Number of Conditions											
Sector Number	Sector Description	All						Percent of Total					
		All	-1	0	1	All	No Compliance	All	1	All	Partial Compliance	All	Full Compliance
Depth		All Depth 1 Conditions						Percent of Total					
Compliance		All						All Depth 1 Conditions					
Effectiveness		All	-1	0	1	All	No Compliance	All	1	All	Partial Compliance	All	Full Compliance
1	Tax Policy/Tax Administration	10	0	1	9	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
2	PEM	11	1	4	6	3	1	0	2	5	0	3	0
3	Financial Sector	26	0	13	13	7	0	6	1	4	0	3	1
4	SOE Reform	11	1	0	10	1	0	0	1	4	1	0	3
5	Privatization	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
6	Civil Service Reform	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
7	Social Policies	4	0	0	4	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	3
8	Other Fund Core	5	0	3	2	2	0	2	0	3	0	1	2
9	Other World Bank Core	2	0	0	2	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	1
Total		71	2	22	47	16	1	10	5	17	1	7	9
Core		52	1	21	30	13	1	9	3	12	0	7	5
Non-Core		19	1	1	17	3	0	1	2	5	1	0	4
Sector Number		Percent of Total											
Depth		All						All Depth 1 Conditions					
Compliance		All						All Depth 1 Conditions					
Effectiveness		All	-1	0	1	All	No Compliance	All	1	All	Partial Compliance	All	Full Compliance
1	Tax Policy/Tax Administration	100	0	10	90	100	0	100	0	100	0	0	0
2	PEM	100	9	36	55	100	33	0	67	100	0	60	40
3	Financial Sector	100	0	50	50	100	0	86	14	100	0	75	25
4	SOE Reform	100	9	0	91	100	0	0	100	100	25	0	75
5	Privatization	100	0	100	0	100	0	100	0	100	0	0	0
6	Civil Service Reform	100	0	0	100	100	0	0	0	100	0	0	0
7	Social Policies	100	0	0	100	100	0	100	0	100	0	0	0
8	Other Fund Core	100	0	60	40	100	0	100	0	100	0	33	67
9	Other World Bank Core	100	0	0	100	100	0	0	100	100	6	41	53
Total		100	3	31	66	100	6	63	31	100	6	41	53
Core		100	2	40	58	100	8	69	23	100	0	58	42
Non-Core		100	5	5	89	100	0	33	67	100	20	0	80
Total		100	5	36	59	100	3	66	34	100	6	41	53
Core		100	2	40	58	100	8	69	23	100	0	58	42
Non-Core		100	5	5	89	100	0	33	67	100	20	0	80
Total		100	7	45	48	100	3	66	34	100	6	41	53

Table 3.11. Effectiveness by Structural Depth, Compliance, and Type: GRA^{1/} (concluded)

IV. All SD 2 in GRA		Number of Conditions																
Sector Number	Sector Description	All Depth 2 Conditions						Percent of Total										
		All	No Compliance	Partial Compliance	Full Compliance	All	No Compliance	Partial Compliance	Full Compliance									
Depth	Effectiveness	All	-1	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14
1	Tax Policy/Tax Administration	5	0	3	2	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
2	PEM	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
3	Financial Sector	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
4	SOE Reform	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
5	Privatization	6	0	6	0	2	0	2	0	3	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
6	Civil Service Reform	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
7	Social Policies	2	2	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
8	Other Fund Core	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
9	Other World Bank Core	4	0	2	2	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total		20	2	13	5	9	2	6	1	4	0	4	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Core	7	0	4	3	4	0	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Non-Core	13	2	9	2	5	2	2	1	4	0	4	0	0	0	0	0	0

Sector Number		Number of Conditions																
Sector Number	Sector Description	All Depth 2 Conditions						Percent of Total										
		All	No Compliance	Partial Compliance	Full Compliance	All	No Compliance	Partial Compliance	Full Compliance									
Depth	Effectiveness	All	-1	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14
1	Tax Policy/Tax Administration	100	0	60	40	100	0	100	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
2	PEM	100	0	0	100	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
3	Financial Sector	100	0	100	0	100	0	100	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
4	SOE Reform	100	0	100	0	100	0	100	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
5	Privatization	100	0	100	0	100	0	100	0	100	0	100	0	100	0	100	0	0
6	Civil Service Reform	100	0	100	0	100	0	100	0	100	0	100	0	100	0	100	0	0
7	Social Policies	100	100	0	0	100	100	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
8	Other Fund Core	100	0	50	50	100	0	0	100	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
9	Other World Bank Core	100	0	50	25	100	22	67	11	100	0	100	0	100	0	100	0	0
Total		100	10	65	25	100	22	67	11	100	0	100	0	100	0	100	0	0
	Core	100	0	57	43	100	0	100	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Non-Core	100	15	69	15	100	40	40	20	100	0	100	0	100	0	100	0	0

1/ Includes 906 fully assessed conditions in the 43 case study countries excluding all PAs. Conditions not normalized to correct for program length.

Source: MONA, IMF staff reports and IEO staff calculations.